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Sarbanes-Oxley: Was It Worth It?*
Christian Leuz, Anthony Nasharr, Kristofer Swanson, and
Barry Chatz
MR. LEUZ: I was pointed out to get us started here. The panel is
supposed to discuss whether Sarbanes-Oxley 1 was worth it and, in par-
ticular, talk about the consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley,2 including
some potentially unintended consequences.
I thought I would begin with the claim frequently voiced in the
press that Sarbanes-Oxley 3 has actually caused a lot of firms to go
private. I would like to share some data with you based on research I
have done on this matter, as I thought it would set the stage for the
discussion.
What we have here in the graph is an increasing going-private
trend-this is basically the number of deregistrations from the SEC.
The way "going private" is defined here is in the same way the SEC
defines going private, i.e., as filing Form Fifteen 4 with the SEC in or-
der to deregister. Once firms have less than three hundred holders of
record, they can terminate their obligation to file with the SEC by
filing this form.
So when you look at that graph, it looks like there is a huge spike in
2003, indicating a significant number of firms deregistering. However,
you have to take into account one thing, which is that firms can actu-
ally deregister from the SEC but continue to trade in public equity
markets. They can trade in the over-the-counter markets, mainly shed-
ding their reporting obligation, but they are not recapitalizing, nor
ceasing to trade. So what are these firms doing? They are going dark.
They are really shutting down their disclosure, but they are not "real"
going-private transactions in the sense of a recapitalization or change
in the ownership.
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the first panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Corporate Governance: The Ins and Outs for Ds and
Os, held on April 19, 2007.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. . L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 249.323 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml5.pdf.
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Looking at the trends broken down into these two categories, you
see that the spike in 2003 and 2004 is really coming from the firms that
are going dark, not from firms that are indeed going private. Going-
dark firms, when you look at their characteristics, tend to be very dif-
ferent from going-private firms. They are typically smaller and many
of them are distressed. Thus, shedding their reporting obligations and
saving their reporting costs is potentially a very sensible strategy for
them.
Now you may look at these numbers and say, the chart goes only to
2004; how does this evidence comport with anecdotal evidence that we
read in the press every day? We hear and read that there are more and
more going-private deals.
So let us look at more recent trends in going private; this time I give
you the total going-private volume in dollars. You clearly see-there
are huge increases in 2004 and 2005, and then another increase in
2006. That is what we read about in the press.
But to get at the question of whether SOX5 is behind this trend, you
want to take a closer look and ask, "Where is the volume coming
from?" It turns out that the volume spike is really coming from the
recent mega deals. It is coming from very large going-private transac-
tions. It is not coming from smaller deals.
The number of going-private transactions has not gone up very
much in recent years, which is inconsistent with a Sarbanes-Oxley 6
explanation. If the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley 7 is driving firms to go pri-
vate, you would think that the smaller firms are the ones that are
more likely to be hit by the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley8 and, hence, re-
spond by going private.
But when you look at the average-deal sizes, you see the average-
deal size has increased, rather than declined, which, in my mind, is
inconsistent with Sarbanes-Oxley 9 being behind the trend.
With that said, you might have noticed that there still is a little spike
in 2003 and that the average deal size takes a dip in 2003. So you
might say, "Could this blip be coming from Sarbanes-Oxley?"' 10
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of





10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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Well, let's look at recent trends in going private worldwide. What
you see is that the trend worldwide pretty much tracks the trend that
we see in the U.S. It looks very similar in terms of the time-series
pattern. So, to me, when I look at this, it does not seem to be the case
that the going-private trend is really much related to Sarbanes-
Oxley,1 per se. That is at least something that I would like to put out
there for further discussion.
Finally, to give you a brief summary of the evidence that I have seen
in academic research, it is very difficult to assess the economy-wide
effects of Sarbanes-Oxley.12 There are a few studies where people
look at stock price reactions around the key legislative events to get a
sense for how the market is pricing the new legislation.
But it turns out that the key legislative events are contaminated
with many other political and economic news that took place right
around the same time. It was a very volatile time period when
Sarbanes-Oxley 13 was passed; and, hence, it is very difficult to parse
out those effects.
For that reason, it is interesting to look at avoidance strategies
where firms are responding to the regulation. If the new regulation
was very costly, we would expect to see firms engage in activities that
avoid these costs and you would expect these activities to be associ-
ated with the Act. 14 But as I showed you, there is very little evidence
that going private increased after SOX, 15 which would be one of the
avoidance strategies.
What people have not yet looked at as much in research is the issue
of foreign listings. We hear that foreign listings are going elsewhere.
We can discuss this issue further, if that is of interest to the audience. I
am also not aware of studies that have looked at going public, i.e.,
whether going public has taken a hit as a consequence of Sarbanes-
Oxley 16 making it more costly to be a public firm.
There is, however, some evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley 7 has in-
creased the scrutiny firms face. For instance, we see significant market
reactions to the disclosure of internal-control deficiencies. There are





15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
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number of firms that have disclosed that they have found those weak-
nesses through Section 404.18
Whether all this, however, means that, on balance, the costs out-
weigh the benefits or the other way around, I think that is up for de-
bate and that is something that we can address in this panel.
I also would say having looked at this evidence that there is very
little doubt that the smaller firms have been hit fairly significantly by
this regulation given that it was kind of constructed as a one-size-fits-
all regulation. But the SEC is currently looking at this issue and the
question of whether smaller firms deserve a break or should be
treated differently from a multi-billion-dollar corporation.
That is all I had to say to get us started.
MR. JOE MARINO: I have a question. Sarbanes-Oxley' 9 really ap-
plies towards companies that are filed, but it is not applicable to the
hedge funds. And right now, it looks like there is a lot of talk about
the hedge funds have been regulating themselves by absorbing certain
failures, but that seems to be a careening truck going for a brick wall.
I mean, when-and I believe there is some suspicion that within the
next eighteen months we might see a failure of a major hedge fund.
And all of this is going to-does not apply to that. Do you think that
there should be more regulation with regards to hedge funds in the
United States and whether or not it is a loophole that avoids SOX?2°
MR. NASHARR: I do not know if I will answer that question di-
rectly, but maybe indirectly in the focus that I-
A PARTICIPANT: Can you speak into the microphone, please? We
cannot hear you.
MR. NASHARR: We have each somewhat defined a little bit of our
own focus here, each carrying a little different angle to the discussion
here.
I believe that Professor Leuz could certainly answer your question,
but what I am getting into may give us a background to do that.
MR. JOE MARINO: Okay.
MR. NASHARR: Tony Nasharr. I am an attorney here. I specialize
in financial institutions. I represent a couple of public companies, but
largely my clientele is private companies. And your question was re-
garding hedge funds, which are private companies essentially. But a
lot of these hedge funds have investors and-where they have lending
18. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
20. Id.
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relationships with third parties. And that is where the impact, the un-
intended impact, of Sarbanes-Oxley 21 comes into play.
Certainly the regulation is clear. This is intended for publicly traded
companies, and it is intended to reinforce the public trust in our public
companies as investments and business environment in general. How-
ever, the unintended impact-and you could argue whether it is posi-
tive or negative-the unintended impact is that Sarbanes's 22
provisions, the regulations that have come out of it, and then just the
general scope of what the focus is with public companies-what it has
done is it has caused private companies to think what do we have to
do? It has also caused-and somewhat importantly for a lot of us who
may contribute to private foundations who are public charities-it has
imposed certain things on not-for-profit organizations as well.
The reason for that is that the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley 23 needs
to be best practices; and best practices are just things that companies
should want to do to be compliant with either third-party require-
ments, whether those be imposed by a lender or a significant vendor
that you have, or even a customer. Those customers could be govern-
ments, government agencies, federal agencies, or state agencies who,
in their contract with you as a private company, they impose certain
restrictions, which are really arising out of the Sarbanes-Oxley 24 net of
requirements. Those are auditing requirements. They are board of di-
rectors's independence requirements. They are whistle-blower re-
quirements. So you get these unintended impacts of Sarbanes-Oxley 25
on private companies and not-for-profit organizations.
In the particular question regarding hedge funds, as I said, you are
going to get the imposition of these whether the regulation exists di-
rectly related to hedge funds or not, and that is going to come from,
like I said, lenders who are going to loan you five hundred million or a
billion dollars. They are going to want certain audit requirements, au-
dit reports on a periodic basis. When you call your auditor in to say,
hey, we need to get this audit done to comply with our lenders' re-
quirements or our customers' requirements, the auditor is going to
say, well, where is your audit policy? Where is your conflict of interest





24. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
25. Id.
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And those are all things that have come out of Sarbanes-Oxley 26 as
things that are imposed on publicly traded companies, and now into
the private sector as well. I do not know if that specifically answers
your question. Another answer to that question is that as people see
the word "hedge fund" in the paper, they ask questions. They ask
questions to their legislators. And when the legislators start thinking
about it, there is no stopping that truck. And if something happens, if
one of these hedge funds buys a company that later goes under and
other people are hurt by that, I can guarantee you that the legislators
will find a way to expand Sarbanes-Oxley 27 to those organizations.
So that is not a clear answer, but it is around what your question is.
MR. JOE MARINO: That is closing the door after the horse left
the barn.
MR. NASHARR: But isn't all regulation? I mean, maybe I am-
MR. JOE MARINO: Reactive, yes. It is not proactive.
MR. NASHARR: -overstating it, but, substantially, regulation is
imposed to deal with a perceived wrong, whether it is a traffic issue or
a financial reporting issue. So you are always going to have that, and
there is no fix for that fact in my opinion. But that is me.
I will defer to Kris here. If there are any questions, I think we are
going to pick it up later. But that is where we are at.
MR. SWANSON: I am going to try doing my remarks from here
because I think I am too tall for the microphone and you guys will
probably not hear me as well.
First, I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today. I ap-
plaud the students at the DePaul Business and Commercial Law Jour-
nal for organizing this Symposium and contributing so significantly to
the debate on this important topic.
At the time it was passed, many of Congressman Oxley's constitu-
ents in the fair State of Ohio had the general attitude towards CEOs
of, "Give them a fair trial and hang them!" And it is not surprising,
since SOX2 8 was emergency legislation, that it represented an oppor-
tunity for many special interests to pad the enacted legislation with
many pet provisions. And even Congressman Oxley concedes that the
implementation has not been perfect.
However, although many criticisms have been leveled against




29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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you about some of the benefits that I have seen based on my experi-
ence working with a wide variety of corporate clients and boards.
Let me start by giving you some background on who I am and what
I do since this impacts my perspective. First, my observations are in-
fluenced by what I have observed firsthand in the context of my cur-
rent job as a consultant and forensic accountant, where I am often
retained to serve as an advisory to boards and executive management
teams who are trying to quickly, discreetly, and thoroughly investigate
various allegations. As we like to say, fraud is a recession-proof
business.
Second, I am a former auditor with Arthur Andersen, a former
chief financial officer of a Chicago-based futures firm, a certified pub-
lic accountant, and certified fraud examiner. I am an alum of the Uni-
versity of Chicago's MBA program. And I am also an alum of DePaul
University's Graduate School of Business where I earned an MS and
accounting degree; and I used to eat at Demon Dogs under the "L"
tracks at Fullerton before I got married and it got bulldozed.
So, what are some of the benefits that I have seen from SOX?30 I
am going to share six with you today.
First, SOX 31 has generated significant business for law firms. (I
think this is what they mean when they say, "Know your audience.")
Some of the factors contributing to this include the rise of indepen-
dent investigations led by outside counsel, the migration of significant
tax talent from the public accounting firms to law firms, and the in-
creasing need by executives to hire their own attorneys to advise them
in certain situations where, in the past, they may have tried to get the
gefieral counsel to give them personal legal advice on the side.
So how is this good for shareholders or society as a whole? Well,
let's take the rise of independent investigations. In the past, and I
know you will be shocked, but if something hinky was suspected, it
would not be uncommon for various members of management to try
to investigate it internally, quietly, and sometimes halfheartedly. And,
not surprisingly, if the person running the investigation was involved
in the hinky activities, had no training in how to conduct an investiga-
tion, or was somehow beholden to the person or persons of interest, it
would not be uncommon for the investigation to wrap up quickly with
the conclusion that nothing inappropriate or material had been found.
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Today, if serious and credible allegations arise-and you see this,
for example, with stock option back-dating investigations that are go-
ing on. So, if allegations arise which implicate senior members of man-
agement, it is really de rigueur for the board to establish a special
committee-sometimes it is the audit committee, but often it is a spe-
cial committee-for the special committee to retain separate, compe-
tent, independent counsel and to ensure that a thorough investigation
occurs.
Second, in my opinion-and I am not an attorney-but second, in
my opinion, SOX 32 has been very empowering for general counsels. I
think it is helped to underscore the fact that lawyers in public compa-
nies represent the company as a whole, not its officers and directors.
It is a lot more demanding I think to be a G.C. today. At one time,
in-house positions were often perceived as being less demanding than
in private practice. And it was not uncommon for the management
team to tag the general counsel as the "Chicken Little" of the man-
agement team, or sometimes the "Department of No."
Today, members of management fully recognize that they ignore
their general counsel's advice at their own peril; and the job I think
is-at least the generals counsel that I have talked to say-it is signifi-
cantly more exciting and challenging, and, of course, the compensa-
tion and benefits get better every year.
Third, SOX 33 has made boards and board committees more rele-
vant. I think that it has made board committees acutely aware that
they may be held personally liable for corporate decision-making. This
is universally considered very bad by some; but, on the other hand,
they tell me it is much more exciting to be on boards today than in the
old days when it was not uncommon for CEOs to appoint you and
expect you to be simply docile and adoring.
So if a typical audit committee met two to three times pre-SOX,
34 it
is not uncommon for a typical audit committee to meet eight or nine
times a year post-SOX. 3 5 Now I am not big on meetings for the sake
of meetings, but we see boards really grappling with critical and stra-
tegic issues these days, replacing CEOs instead of being replaced by
CEOs, and meeting more often in executive session.
Director and officer liability insurance premiums have increased,
and not nearly as much golf is being played; but before feeling too
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
35. Id.
[Vol. 5:643
SARBANES-OXLEY: WAS IT WORTH IT?
sorry for these men and women, note that their average compensation
has increased from approximately sixty thousand to over ninety-three
thousand per year, which is not a bad paycheck for a part-time job.
Four, SOX,36 in my opinion, has dramatically clarified the indepen-
dent auditor's responsibility. SOX37 requires, for example, that the au-
ditor report to an independent audit committee instead of
management. And as a former auditor, I can report firsthand that this
single provision significantly righted a relationship that had too often
been exploited when management demanded that the auditors treat
management as the client.
And, if audit firms are required to be independent, doesn't it make
sense that the group they report to should also be independent? Oth-
erwise, I think you kind of defeat the purpose of requiring indepen-
dence. It is like having a doctor sterilize her surgical tools but not
wash her hands.
Fifth, I think SOX 38 has put management on notice. With the new
Section 40439 certification process, it is a lot harder for management to
simultaneously expect to get paid to manage while later relying on an
ignorance defense if misleading or fraudulent financial statements
were issued on their watch.
In addition, SOX 40 makes it unlawful for officers, directors, and
their agents to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead
the audit firm. In other words, it is finally illegal to lie to your audi-
tors. We have seen in a number of the recent stock option back-dating
investigations that those companies that intentionally hid facts from
their auditors were first in line for criminal prosecution.
Finally, SOX41 has strengthened a culture of compliance in corpo-
rate America, reducing both errors and fraud. By implementing the
Section 40442 certification process, setting up whistle-blower hot lines,
developing codes of ethics, and so forth, the culture and control envi-
ronments within many companies has been strengthened. Many com-
panies in the process of implementing SOX 43 discovered that they had




39. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
41. Id.
42. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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trols. PepsiCo, for example, in the complex area of pension account-
ing, reportedly discovered that many basic steps that it had thought
were being performed, such as accounting reconciliations and interest
calculations, were not being done.
It is not surprising that things had fallen through the cracks when
you recognize that businesses merge and grow, employees come and
go, managers get rotated into different areas of responsibility, and so
forth. When people invest in companies where the financial state-
ments have errors, they are not really getting what they think they are
buying; and when companies experience or commit fraud, Americans
lose billions.
In conclusion, SOX44 has clearly been one of the most significant
laws implemented in my lifetime. However, in terms of the question
raised in this session's title, "Was it Worth it," I am going to punt. I am
assuming that George Stigler was right when he earned the Nobel
Prize in economics for his work proving that there is a market for
government regulation, a supply and demand for government regula-
tion, often with unintended and far-reaching consequences. In other
words, we got the law that we demanded at the time and thought that
we wanted.
With the passage of time and the kinds of critical analysis that the
DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal has been known for
fostering, I suspect that the best parts of SOX 45 will be preserved and
that other parts will be improved. Barry?
MR. CHATZ: Wow! I wish I was an accountant.
I am too short to stand at the podium.
SOX46 was intended to increase regulation and oversight of the ac-
counting profession because more stringent auditor and audit commit-
tee independence creates greater corporate responsibility and
accountability, more professional responsibility for lawyers, increased
issuer disclosures, increased regulation of security analysts, and in-
creased criminal penalties.
This statute attempts to impose ethics and morality on corporate
governance. In a democratic world, that is a fiction.
If we look to what has happened, notwithstanding what good-na-
tured, virtuous directors, audit committee members seek to do in rein-
forcing corporate trust and corporate morality, the fact is we continue
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reason this happened is that it related to Enron and it is an energy
concern.
If we take a look at recent events, nobody really seems to care
about what is happening with New Century and the other small-or
the types of lenders that deal with poor people, high interest loans.
And those companies just fail; and, yes, maybe there will be criminal
charges or otherwise, but Sarbanes-Oxley 47 did nothing to protect the
borrowers or the investors in those types of companies. We now have
an indictment of some guy named David Stockman, a Reagan benefi-
ciary in the Collins and Aikman case.48 That is great. That does not
mean that Collins and Aikman did not fail.
So that the protocol here in the discussion is "What has this done?".
It has enriched accountants, lawyers, in certain circumstances requir-
ing corporate people and corporate, whether it is law firms, account-
ing firms to act more responsible, for people to take responsibility;
but, as a bankruptcy trustee and a bankruptcy lawyer, it will do noth-
ing to prevent the criminals, the bad guys from taking advantage of
circumstances.
It is terrific that accountant gets information, but if it is wrong, if
that person wishes it to be wrong, it will still be wrong and so they
may be subject to criminal penalties. Big whoop! It does not really
matter.
So instead of having corporate governance in public companies,
what is happening is exactly the protocol and the conundrum that the
member of the audience raised. What is happening is that the private
hedge funds invested in by multiple international governments, com-
panies, and otherwise who have no reporting requirements are begin-
ning to control corporate America.
And that, from an investor standpoint, whether you are an investor
or just interested in understanding what happens in public markets,
reflects that we will have less information. There will be failures.
There already has been failures in corporate circumstance in hedge
funds. And what is interesting, however, is that our market is just an-
other commodity; and those companies seem to be failing and nobody
cares. Whether it is, as I said, New Century, hedge funds, or otherwise,
I do not think that those markets are in any way, shape, or form in our
government's interest sector. And, until they are, there will not be any
47. Id.
48. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Litigation Release No. 20055, SEC.GOV, March 26, 2007,
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/r20O55.htm.
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additional changes because, in essence, in my view, Sarbanes-Oxley 49
is a dramatic failure other than enriching me and my law partners.
Tony, what do you think?
MR. NASHARR: You have not lost your cynicism, Barry.
He and I go back a little ways. I finance them and he takes them
into bankruptcy, and then I got to chase him and his clients. But we
are still friends.
MR. LEUZ: Let me actually take up Barry's comment and agree
with him that I do not think that laws and regulation can completely
prevent corporate fraud where people go as far as faking sales or fak-
ing accounts receivables. I think these are actions where the auditors
are going to have a very hard time, and I do not think that the securi-
ties regulation is designed to completely prevent these cases.
For this reason, the issue of whether SOX 50 was worth it or not
needs to be debated over cases, not where there is egregious fraud,
but where firms, as Kris has described it, have been somewhat negli-
gent, but not in a purposeful way, and where the internal controls
have been lax. The question is whether for these firms internal con-
trols have improved in ways that benefit investors. I think it is pro-
gress in these areas that we need to judge.
I do not think that it would be right to approach or evaluate regula-
tion by whether it has eliminated fraud. With that same approach, you
would probably dismiss the Thirty-Three 5l and the Thirty-Four Act 52
because they have not completely prevented fraud either. I think the
issue is, under normal circumstances, does SOX53 improve a firm's
affairs.
MR. SWANSON: If you look at the numbers, just to pick up on
Christian's comment, if you look at all the numbers of restatements
that a lot of companies have done lately, the restatements were caused
by implementing SOX,54 and it meant that the prior financials had
errors in them.
49. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
50. Id.
51. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2007)).
52. Securities Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78u
(2007)).
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
54. Id.
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So, clearly, the controls have improved in a number of companies.
They will not prevent economic failures. And SOX 55 was not designed
to prevent that. I mean, that is part of the function of capitalism is
taking risks and recognizing that there are very few guarantees in life.
MR. GARY LEWIS: A famous Chicago son, Al Capone, could not
get arrested for what he may have done, but they found another ave-
nue. In the same way, I feel that the Sarbanes-Oxley 56 was able to
compel people at a high level to be responsible for things that they
were not responsible for. And they take a greater risk in avoiding that
situation. It makes people wary of acting outside of Sarbanes-Oxley. 57
I have a friend of mine who is currently chairman of FASB, Bob
Herz; and he was very active in writing this bill. He told me that, obvi-
ously, he loves Sarbanes-Oxley.5 8 But he told me that the problems
that arise now are because companies are going outside of the New
York Stock Exchange to be registered so that they would not be-
they would not be responsible for Sarbanes-Oxley.5 9 Because you go
to London or you go somewhere else to register, and this is what is
putting pressure on changing Sarbanes-Oxley. 60 Any comments?
MR. SWANSON: You made a number of good points. Thanks.
I think the question is the increasing number of listings in London,
is that due somehow to Sarbanes-Oxley? 61 That is a comment I have
heard a number of people make. I have not seen any evidence for
that. There may be a number of potential factors. I think that some
would argue that the exchanges, the European exchanges, have be-
come more competitive over time. There have been mergers and other
things that have caused them to be become more competitive; and, of
course, the U.S. dollar has been dropping steadily in value. I think the
pound hit an all-time high this week.
So it is an interesting question, but I am not sure the answer is as
clear as employees of the New York Stock Exchange would purport.
MR. LEUZ: Let me follow up on that and share a couple pieces of
evidence. We have fairly substantial evidence that firms are coming to
the United States and cross-listing on the New York Stock Exchange
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There are many firms in emerging markets that would find it very
difficult to raise capital in their home markets because it would be
very difficult for them to reassure outside investors that they are not
taking the money or engaging in behavior that primarily benefits in-
siders, i.e., consume the money in the form of private control benefits.
Firms that have good growth opportunities and want to raise
outside capital find the U.S. to be a place where they can come and
actually bond and, in some sense, signal to the outside world that they
are willing to play by the toughest rules. Consistent with this idea, we
do have evidence that the capital markets reward cross-listing in the
U.S.; I think this is an important thing to keep in mind.
Now it is true that listings in London are way up and, in particular,
the AIM market has picked up a number of firms. But there is re-
search that looks at the characteristics of these firms and asks whether
these are firms that would have come to the United States prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley. 62 As it turns out, there is very little evidence of that.
The AIM market has picked up a lot of very small firms, but it is not
clear that they would have come to NASDAQ or NYSE. AIM has
picked up a lot of firms from Russia where it is not clear that, even
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, 63 they would have passed the muster or the
corporate governance standards that would be imposed by the SEC.
Thus, while it is true that the listings are down, but I am not sure
that the U.S. is losing many firms that should be here in the first place.
There may be several out there, but I do not think that we are talking
about hundreds of firms that are not coming to the United States be-
cause of Sarbanes-Oxley. 64
MR. CHATZ: I do think that it is important, though, that there is a
question as to whether this legislation has had some effect upon the
value of the dollar. It is possible that the increased costs have, in a
micro way, impacted upon that because of the nature of what we do
and what we require in this country versus others. And it will poten-
tially have economic consequences to our markets and to our compa-
nies down the road.
MR. NASHARR: I would make a comment to that, that while there
appears to be an impact on the dollar, or you could argue that there is
if the question of "was it worth it" is answered with observation to-
wards the stock indices, which are fairly strong and up and even the
last few weeks have continued to rise; the legislation was intended to
62. Id.
63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
64. Id.
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enforce public confidence in our public companies, to support invest-
ment, and make people confident that when they put their money into
a public company, it would be handled in a proper way and they
would have a good return on their investment. It was not focused on
let's strengthen the dollar.
And regulation-you can have your opinions on what regulation
does, but if you look at the focus of this regulation, it seems to have
worked; and, therefore, you could answer the question "is it worth it"
with an affirmative statement. Maybe not an absolute yes, but it cer-
tainly has done the job.
Now you take other focuses, those focuses being what is the cost to
U.S. business; does that cost drive others away or cause foreign com-
panies not to want to come here? That is certainly something to look
at, and it is certainly something that the media looks at. And the me-
dia-I think Professor Leuz would say that the media in looking at-
and I do not want to put words in your mouth-but the media, in
looking at that, focuses on the negative. They say, oh, look at all these
companies that are delisting; foreign companies are not listing on the
stock exchange. But if you look at the last five years compared to the
previous five years, there has not been that significant of a change. It
is just, in my opinion, chicken little calling look at all the negatives
that it is causing.
MR. SWANSON: Let me add to that.
MR. CHATZ: Let me interrupt. From a valuation perspective,
though, since this legislation has been enacted, the dollar has de-
creased significantly such that, from a foreign investment standpoint,
the stock market's value really has negligibly changed.
MR. SWANSON: Let's add some numbers, some real numbers to
the debate.
When President Bush signed SOX,65 the Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage was at about seven thousand. Yesterday66 it closed at a record
high of over twelve thousand eight hundred. The spread on invest-
ment rate bonds at the time it was signed was, I think, about 2.85
percent. Now it is about eighty-five basis points.
So the cost that shows up on the income statement, the cost that
management is often most sensitive to, is the out-of-pocket cost of
Sarbanes-Oxley 67 because it runs through the income statement. The
cost of capital, except for debt, does not show up on the income state-
65. Id.
66. April 18, 2007.
67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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ment. It is not quantified separately. And, in general, the cost of
Sarbanes-Oxley 68 for a multi-billion dollar company, if the annual run
rate is an extra one and a half million, it is just a rounding error.
MR. CHATZ: Good rounding error.
MR. AL CERGOL: Question: U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul-
son made some comments, I believe, in the November time frame re-
garding this exact subject. I like what the gentleman said about
chicken little, but it was something to the effect that-and I do not
remember. I cannot paraphrase what he said exactly, but it sounded
like just the opposite of what you are referring to, that there is too
much regulation, there is too much corporate governance, and it
should be reduced.
Did you hear any-you are smiling. You probably saw that same
article that I did. Do you have any comment about the Treasury Secre-
tary's comments?
MR. SWANSON: There are a number of things in there-for exam-
ple, the big four independent accounting firms would like some sort of
limitation on liability. Well, so would I. But, so far, there is not a con-
sensus in this country that that is the right thing to do.
So, it is a democracy, as Barry pointed out; and there is a debate,
and the debate is good. Barry, you probably would like to add to that
question, right?
MR. CHATZ: As you say, this is either good or bad depending on
your perspective; and, in my perspective, I think that any crook is go-
ing to steal. Anyone can manipulate any financial data that they wish
to. We continue to see it in the marketplace. The dollar continues to
decline, and it will continue to decline notwithstanding whatever regu-
lations exist because the value of what we provide in the international
marketplace continues to recede. And other than people like Kris and
Navigant and Tony who provide intellectual services, the value of our
commodities will continue to decrease.
With that in mind, the circumstance and the requirements for our
businesses to show profits will be potentially at risk. And we should
have some interesting analysis going forward.
MR. LEUZ: I would like to make one quick comment back to his
question. First of all, I think Kris is exactly right by pointing out that
there are some benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley 69 that are not going to
show up in corporate income statements. That said, in our research we
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cross-listings in the United States get, on average, a benefit in their
cost of capital between thirty to eighty basis points. That is a lot if you
consider the average size of firms that come to the United States. The
average is on the order of ten billion dollars. Thus, thirty to eighty
basis points is large in terms of its economic magnitude. Firms are
saving a lot that they can use to counterbalance the extra costs that
are coming from Sarbanes-Oxley. 70
We have also looked at the equity premium and, in particular,
whether the premium has decreased post Sarbanes-Oxley. 71 We do
not find that the cost of capital has changed substantially. That is, the
cost of capital benefits has not become smaller. I think this is an im-
portant-this is something important to keep in mind.
With that said, one issue is that regulation is often imposed as a
one-size-fits-all regulation rather tailored to than address the needs of
particular sectors of the economy or particular firms in the economy.
If you look at the spectrum you have in public firms in this country,
you have firms out there that are publicly listed with ten million in
total assets. And you have firms that are multi-billion dollar compa-
nies. They are facing, in many regards, the same regulation.
To me, it seems hard to believe that this is optimal. It just-that
does not make sense. I, therefore, think it would be important to think
about scalability. Would it make sense to have different regulations
for different sectors of the economy or different size categories? And
to what extent are we ratcheting it up to a level where the costs out-
weigh the benefits for certain parts of the economy?
I think it is very different whether we are talking about GE or
Microsoft or whether we are talking about a small twenty million dol-
lar firm.
MR. SWANSON: I like, in theory, Christian's point. The hard part,
of course, is that Sarbanes-Oxley 72 runs the risk of looking like the
Internal Revenue Code with a separate version of SOX 73 for every
company out there with a lobby. So it is quite a challenge once you
start trying to modify it for certain groups.
MR. LEUZ: Let me put out a suggestion: Why should we not give
more decision rights to the exchanges? That way, firms are selecting
into a regime by listing on an exchange. Of course, it would be impor-
tant for investors to understand the rules of the particular exchange
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
73. Id.
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on this matter. But I think it is worth considering letting firms choose
what regulation they are going to play with, and the markets are going
to price that.
MR. CHATZ: Question, particularly to Kris: The issue I have is,
going back to the hedge fund question, what do you potentially see as
the type of regulation that might impact them, if any? And how would
that, in fact, be implemented? Any thoughts of that at all?
MR. SWANSON: Well, I think the big challenge with hedge
funds-as they are trying to continue to achieve extraordinary re-
turns-many of them are chasing more and more unusual investment
strategies and holding investments that are less and less liquid. Mean-
while, in terms of compensation, most of them receive two percent of
assets under management plus a twenty percent share of the upside.
As they invest in more and more things where they themselves get
to decide what the market value is prior to a cash-out on any one of
these individual investments, we are getting into the impact of the ap-
plicable accounting rules. And the question is whether the accounting
rules are contributing, along with their fee structure, to incentives that
are likely to create higher risks of fraud and whether we are going to
see more collapses.
I think that is an important question and it will be very interesting
to see how things play out over the next year or so.
MR. JACOB SCHUSTER: There has been kind of a global initia-
tive against corruption with the United Nations's convention on cor-
ruption being signed and ratified. I was wondering, from the
standpoint of Mr. Leuz's point earlier about how that Sarbanes-
Oxley74 was actually attracting capital to the United States, I was won-
dering-that kind of goes against my traditional notion of how mul-
tinationals would go to other countries because they have laxer
environmental laws or labor laws and that kind of thing.
So, I am wondering, are other countries discussing or thinking
about implementing a similar strategy or implementing similar
legislation?
MR. LEUZ: I do know that in Europe several countries have been
thinking about implementing rules that mimic or are very close to
SOX. 7s But despite these efforts, I do not think that securities regula-
tion is nearly as tightly enforced anywhere in the world as it is in the
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That said, many markets have thought about putting in place re-
quirements (e.g. about independence) either for audit committees or
directors. The U.K. is one example. But different countries take dif-
ferent approaches in terms of how these requirements are legislated.
Some of it has to do with the fact that, in the United States, these rules
are part of the securities regulation; whereas, in Europe, they are part
of company law. But while different countries take different ap-
proaches, there is a general trend to ratchet up the securities regula-
tion and investor protection around the world. But other countries
have not gone as far as the 40476 internal controls requirement.
MR. KEN MARCUS: I apologized if I missed it. I looked at the
conclusion on the board that says, "There's little evidence that total
costs outweigh the benefits." Has anybody quantified the costs?
MR. SWANSON: What are the costs? To quote Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, there are the known knowns; there are the known
unknowns; and there are the unknown unknowns. We do not know
what the but-for world would have looked like without SOX.77
So it depends: which costs? Certain costs you know, clearly. But did
it prevent a massive fraud at some other major company like
WorldCom? I do not know. But if it prevented one-recall that Enron
was a ninety billion loss with a lot of investors. Ninety billion dollars
pays for centuries of ongoing SOX costs. 78
MR. KEN MARCUS: The answer is we do not know; we are just
dancing around.
The only comment I had that makes a lot of sense has to go to the
scalability. If you put the same regulations on a small company that
you do on a mega company, it may be a lot more difficult for the
smaller company to show those costs.
MR. SWANSON: Absolutely. But, remember, smaller companies
do not have to go public. They can stay private. And smaller compa-
nies go out of business often. And it would be interesting to see over
time. Christian may have looked at this, but smaller companies are
particularly vulnerable to fraud. They do not have the internal control
structure. They may not have the sophistication in certain areas. It
may be easier for management to override certain things. And so,
again, it is a very interesting question. Fair points all around. But I do
not know that conclusive evidence is available yet.
76. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
78. Id.
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MR. KEN MARCUS: The question, though: has anybody quanti-
fied the cost?
MR. LEUZ: Let me try to answer this question. There are a few
attempts out there to quantify the costs, or at least the net costs or
benefits. Several studies try to infer these from the stock price
reaction.
But SOX 79 was passed (for the most part) in the second half of July,
which was one of the worst time periods in 2002 in terms of stock
price performance. Can we attribute the stock price market perform-
ance over that time period to Sarbanes-Oxley 8° when, at the same
time, there was news about the possibility that the U.S. might go to
war with Iraq and there were a host of other macro news coming out?
I think attributing stock price performance would be extremely
difficult.
So the short answer to your question is "yes"-there are people
that have looked at the costs it. But, if you ask me if I believe the
magnitude of their cost estimates, my response would be I am fairly
skeptical.
MR. KEN MARCUS: What about out-of-pocket costs? What about
the cost of complying with regulations? What about the accounting
costs? The legal cost?
MR. LEUZ: There are some estimates for the per-firm costs of im-
plementation, but they are very size dependent. They typically stem
from survey data.
It is important to remember there is always a cost-benefit trade-off,
even when a company tells us they spend a million. The big question is
what did they get for that million.
MR. KEN MARCUS: That is the question. We are saying there is a
conclusion, but we do not know what that cost figure is.
MR. CHATZ: I do not know that you are going to know it. I think
the cost figure is-if there is an increase in companies going private, if
the market does not allow participation by individual investors be-
cause of the lack-because of those costs in the smaller market, if it is
discouraging people from investing and discouraging small businesses
from going to market, that is a huge cost. But that is pure conjecture.
MS. DEBORAH GRAY: There has been recent talk that the New
York Stock Exchange may form some kind of alliance with the Tokyo
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would SOX8 1 have any effect on that situation, if any? In other words,
could this be migrated to other companies through stock exchanges if
there was some sort of cooperation going on?
MR. NASHARR: That is above my elevation to answer that
question.
MR. LEUZ: One of the major concerns about the merger between
NYSE and Euronext, and similarly about the attempt of NASDAQ to
take-over the London Stock Exchange, was that these combinations
would create regulatory spill-over effects where European companies
were, all of a sudden, subject to Sarbanes-Oxley. 82
I would imagine that similar concerns are going to be brought up
when there is a closer alliance between NYSE and Tokyo. But I think
such concerns are understandable, or even reasonable, because you
have to remember that when you are a company in a different coun-
try, you are operating under a very different institutional framework,
and it is not clear that U.S. regulations would necessarily be appropri-
ate or a good fit for you.
So for foreign companies, other than those that explicitly choose to
come here for a cross-listing, the concern that they may have to deal
with Sarbanes-Oxley 83 is understandable, simply because it might not
be a good fit for them.
But you do see firms coming to the United States for cross-listings
despite the fact, or in many cases, because of tight regulations. Note
that even before Sarbanes-Oxley, 4 U.S. regulations have been way
much than anything we have, for instance, in Continental Europe.
Nevertheless, firms have been coming to the U.S. and have been com-
plying with U.S. regulations, presumably because there was a net ben-
efit to doing so.
MR. MIKE KIM: You mentioned in the slide show that there has
been a trend of companies going private. I assume there is a corollary
or correlation between companies staying private and a decrease in
IPOs over the last couple of years. And as practitioners, is that some-
thing that you have been kind of advising more often than not in
terms of the last five years compared to maybe the five before that?
MR. NASHARR: I would not say that in my-
A PARTICIPANT: Would you repeat the question, please? We can-
not hear it in the back.
81. Id.
82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
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MR. NASHARR: I will let you try to do it.
MR. MIKE KIM: I was saying with the trend of going private the
last couple of years, I wanted to know if there were numbers backing
up less IPOs in the same time period. And that as a practitioners, you
know, as a young law student trying to figure out what to do in the
practice, are they advising clients to stay private rather than go public
like the last five years compared to the five years before then?
MR. NASHARR: In my particular practice, I cannot say that I do a
lot of IPO work. My firm does, another department than mine, does
IPO work.
But I would suggest to you that the answer is not that we are advis-
ing companies to stay private, but more as they are considering doing
an IPO, you have to advise them. Well, before you even get there, you
have got this set of regulations that you got to take into account. And
that set of regulations requires audits down the road. And as they take
that advice, they make the decision. We do not tell them, well, stay
private or go public. They make those determinations on their own.
We, as lawyers or lawyers-to-be, try to facilitate their decisions within
the bounds of the law. So those are what we deal with.
MR. SWANSON: Remember, also, that there is a lot of stuff going
on in the world. As Christian pointed out, one of them is this huge
ocean of private equity money floating around. And, the fact that a
private equity firm or team of firms might take Chrysler private, is
that really due to Sarbanes-Oxley? 85 I do not think Sarbanes-Oxley 86
has anything to do with Chrysler's problems.
But that kind of a going-private transaction, I assume, Christian,
would be captured in your numbers?
MR. LEUZ: I agree. As pointed out before, I do not think the re-
cent mega deals have much to do with SOX.87 Also, there are compa-
nies like Aramark that have gone private several times in its history.
Thus, if firms come back to the public markets after five years, then it
is hard to argue they left because of SOX 88 in the first place.
That is, for these firms, going private is a way to facilitate restruc-
turing, but it is unlikely to be related to Sarbanes-Oxley8 9 because, in
the end, they want to be a public firm again.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
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MR. CHATZ: I want to follow up on Kris. He is exactly right. The
private capital, the private equity, the hedge fund money has changed
the market for more of my business sector, too, which is the middle
market and otherwise. I do not see our securities lawyers advising
companies that often to go and take the small IPO when there is avail-
ability for reasonable capital and investment cash in the marketplace
otherwise.
What the nice thing for smaller businesses is that these things are
available, which were products that were not available ten years ago;
and the diligence, just from my market basis, which is in distress, the
availability of cash and the amount of people looking at deals has in-
creased dramatically in the last two to three years. Whether they buy
or not is a different question; but the amount of funds out there con-
tinues to grow.
MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Barry. I think we are going to convert
you into a true believer by the end of the conference this morning.
MR. CHATZ: No, I do not think so.
MR. JEFF APEL: Don't you think it is a little bit ironic then that
you see some of these big private equity firms, like, say, for instance,
KBR, who are responsible for taking, you know, these big companies
private who are actually going public themselves? Doesn't that kind of
say that maybe Sarbanes-Oxley 9° doesn't really cause these burdens?
MR. NASHARR: That is what Kris is saying. It is not really driving
the decision either way. It happens to be a set of regulations that pub-
lic companies have to deal with; and then, as I observed, certain pri-
vate companies or foundations choose to observe, but it is not driving
the activity that we see from private equity firms taking public compa-
nies private.
MR. SWANSON: Picking up on that point, more and more of the
big hedge funds are talking about going public, too. So this whole is-
sue of whether SOX 91 applies to hedge funds, if enough of them go
public, that issue will become moot.
MR. AL CERGOL: You mentioned about ten years ago, in the fi-
nancial markets, I think I remember Alan Greenspan coined the term
"irrational exuberance." There has been a lot of theory and conjecture
about the fed not raising marginal rates to a hundred percent that
caused the two thousand bubble in the equity market.
I am just wondering what the impact of the federal-I mean, yeah,
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hedge fund growth because, at the same time, I think - you probably
know this better than I do-hasn't the explosion of hedge funds gone
from, like, maybe double digits to, like, four digits in the last ten
years? I am wondering what impact it might have here on debt policy,
government, future government regulation, or U.S. government regu-
lation on the amount of hedge funds out there and the risks that goes
along with it. Can you answer that in three sentences?
MR. NASHARR: That is a macro economic-
MR. CHATZ: I think the first issue is is the fed even relevant?
MR. AL CERGOL: It is for a small investor.
MR. CHATZ: I do not know that it is relevant for any decision-
making whatsoever regarding what is happening in the markets. It
may have a short-term blip if they choose to raise or lower, but their
decisions are being absorbed much more quickly than when I was like
these law students, twenty years ago, watching their impacts upon the
markets.
MR. SWANSON: I think with hedge funds you are absolutely right.
If memory serves, I believe the hundred largest, on average, have be-
tween thirteen and thirty-one billion under management.
The rise of the hedge fund is a profound phenomenon in the last ten
decade. Are there significant benefits to having hedge funds in our
financial system? Many people say yes.
I think some of the more troubling issues are things like when
teacher pension funds that are looking at big shortfalls start looking at
investing in hedge funds, sort of the double down and bet the house
approach as a way to recover from the fact that they do not have
enough money to meet their obligations. And is that an appropriate
debate involving public policy and other kinds of issues. The debates
are complex, and I think the role and impact of hedge funds are fac-
tors in a lot of those debates.
MR. CHATZ: With that in mind, unless the professor or Tony have
any other comments, we are going to get close to the end. I hope eve-
rybody has found this to be useful, somewhat enlightening and kind of
answered a couple of questions. I am not sure if it did or not, but I
think we are going to find some interesting impacts in the future, and
we should all keep an eye on what everybody is doing.
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